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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LUKE PHILLIPS and
RUBY PHILLIPS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

Case No.
12740

TOOELE CITY CORPORATION,
Defendant-Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF CASE
This is an action by the Appellants, Luke and Ruby
Phillips, for damage to their automobile as a result of a
collision with a truck owned and operated by the Respondent on December 18, 1970.
1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Upon Trial before a jury before the Honorable
Gordon R. Hall, District Judge, and after Appellants
had rested their case, the Court granted Respondent's
Motion for non-suit and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment were accordingly filed, and
Appellants' Motion for New Trial was denied.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the judgment of
non-suit and the supporting Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by the Trial Court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent will restate the facts inasmuch as Appellants' Statement of Facts contains considerable literary license.
On December 18, 1970, the Appellants were man
and wife. The Appellant, Ruby Phillips, was, by a prior
marriage, the mother of one Phyllis Utahna Perkins who
on said date was sixteen ( 16) years of age and recently
married. ( T. 13, T. 20) The Appellants had purchased
several months previously a 1970 Ford Maverick automobile which was registered in the names of both Ruby
and Luke Phillips. (T. 47) The vehicle was being purchased with funds from the Appellants' family enter-
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prise, the "Club 13" near Tooele. ( T. 56) The "Club
13' business was characterized by the Appellants' Counsel as a "joint family business" (T. 61), Mrs. Phillips
worked one shift and Mr. Phillips worked another in
running the business. ( T. 56) The Appellants had two
vehicles, the .Maverick being used by both Appellants.
Mrs. Phillips on occasion allowed Phyllis Utahna Perkins to drive the automobile and stated that she felt she
had the right to give Phyllis permission to drive the
same. (T. 56) On the day in question, while Phyllis was
visiting at the Appellants' home, her younger brothers
who lived with the Appellants requested to go down
town shopping and asked Phyllis to take them. Phyllis
asked the Appellant, Ruby Phillips, if she could take the
car for that purpose and Ruby gave her permission to
drive the vehicle for that purpose. (T. 49) The Appellant, Ruby Phillips, also had signed the drivers license
application for Phyllis Utahna Perkins prior to said date.
(T. 13) Phyllis then with her younger brothers as pasdrove said automobile onto Utah Avenue. The
roads were snow covered and slippery. (T. 36) As she
was approximately a half block or approximately two
hundred to two hundred fifty feet from the intersection
of Utah Avenue with Fifth Street (T. 15, T. 16, T. 36)
she observed the Respondent's dump truck apparently
stopped on Fifth Street to her right in a position just
behind the dip which runs parallel with the gutter of
Utah Avenue and the truck was toward the middle of
Fifth Street and not to the side. ( T. 8) After observing
the truck in that position, Phyllis did not then again ob-
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serve the dump truck nor was she aware of it again until
it was in front of her ( 'l'. 15) or at the side of her ( T.
16) just prior to collision. There were no other vehicles
in the area. (T. 16) Phyllis was driving at approximately
fifteen miles per hour ('l'. 16) and the truck's speed at
impact was approximately ten miles per hour. (T. 18)
Phyllis testified she did not have time to put on her
prior to the impact. ( T. 18) There also was no
distraction or any reason why she looked away from the
direction she was driving prior to impact. (T. 18, T. 19)
The point of collision was somewhere near the center of
the intersection in the northwest quarter of the intersection, Phyllis traveling approximately twenty feet south
of the north side of Utah Avenue ( T. 22), and the dump
truck traveling approximately near the middle of Fifth
A venue. The damage began on the right front fender of
the Appellants' vehicle (T. 1, T. 2, T. 4), where is apparently came in contact with the left front bumper of
the Defendant's truck. The intersection of Utah Avenue
and Fifth Street is an open intersection with no traffic
control device. (T. 37) The investigating officer determined the point of impact approximately several feet
north of the imaginary center line of Utah Avenue and
just a little bit to the west of the imaginary center line of
Fifth Street, near the center of the road. ( T. 32) The
Defendant's driver told the investigating officer that as
he approached the intersection he looked to the left and
to the right and continued on into the intersection and as
he looked to the left he saw the Appellants' vehicle and
was unable to stop prior to collision. (T. 31, T. 38)

4

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HELD AS A
MATTER OF LAW THAT PHYLLIS UTAHNA PERKINS WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Respondent answers Appellants' Points I, II, and
III in Respondent's Point I herein.
Appellants' case left no doubt as to the negligence
of the driver of the Appellants' vehicle. Phyllis Perkins
testified that she was a half a block away from the intersection when she saw the dump truck and did not then
again observe it nor was she aware of it until just prior
to impact. In the Appellants' case-in-chief the investigating officer, Howard Cooper, testified that Phyllis
Perkins at the scene of the accident pointed out to him
her location when she first saw the dump truck, which he
estimated at that time was two hundred to two hundred
fifty feet from the intersection. Appellants offered no
other evidence that would contradict or in any way refute that testimony. Using the minimum figure of two
hundred feet and her testified speed of fifteen miles an
hour, we can roughly compute that it took her approximately eight seconds to traverse the distance from when
she first saw the dump truck to the point of collision.
This computation being based on the testimony of the
police officer that a vehicle travels at a ratio of one and
one-half times in feet its given speed per second. (T. 37)
Thus, by Phyllis' own testimony there was a time span
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of approximately eight seconds and at least two hundred
feet in which she paid absolutely no attention to a vehicle which she had observed to her right. The roads
were slick and Phyllis made no attempt to slow down or
prepare for any contingency prior to the impact. Under
these circumstances there clearly is no issue for the jury
as to her negligence as all reasonable minds would agree
that such conduct constitutes negligence, which was a
proximate cause of the collision.
This Court on prior occasions has made it clear that
a person approaching an intersection cannot proceed
into an intersection without keeping a lookout as to hazards contained therein or about, and that under certain
circumstances such failure to keep a proper lookout is
negligence as a matter of law. A case directly in point is
Hickok vs. Skinner, 113 Utah 1, 190 P.2d 514 ( 1948).
The Trial Court entered judgment of non-suit against
the Plaintiff which was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
The Plaintiff Hickok stopped at a stop sign at the intersection of 21st South and West Temple. Before he entered the intersection he looked to the east and saw an
automobile about a half a block away, approximately five
hundred feet. He also claimed that there was other traffic which required his attention. However, the Court on
appeal noted that this traffic was such that he was not
confronted with a rapidly moving traffic situation. The
Plaintiff entered the intersection figuring he had time to
make a safe crossing without ever looking back to the
east at the car he had previously seen. He did not again
see that vehicle until the same collided in the middle of
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his vehicle. Plaintiff made no effort to avoid the collision.
The evidence was that it would have taken the Defendant's vehicle approximately six seconds to reach the point
of collision from where Plaintiff first observed him, and
thus that during that period of time that the Plaintiff
failed to re-observe what said vehicle was doing. The
Court observed that even though Plaintiff had the right
of way over Defendant, he could not ignore the Defendant's vehicle even though when he began to move into the
intersection he reasonably believed he had time to get
across. The Court observed that the time element was
such that a reasonably prudent and careful person would
have glanced to the east several times while traversing
the distance from the stop sign to the point of collision,
and that because of his slow speed Plaintiff could have
easily come to a stop in time to avoid the collision. The
Court then held that the Plaintiff was neglectful in regards to heeding and maintaining a proper lookout and
that no jury could reasonably find that he was not negligent.
All of the factors set forth in the Hickok case are
present in the case at bar. Phyllis Perkins had no other
traffic to contend with, she had adequate time and opportunity to observe the actions of the truck, but by her
own admission did not observe the vehicle again until
just prior to impact. It is interesting to note that she testifies the truck was going ten miles an hour at impact and
obviously had traveled at least twenty feet into the intersection prior to her observation just before impact. Phyllis also denies having applied her brakes prior to impact.
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Thus one can only speculate as to where she was looking
and to what her attention was directed, if any, as she obviously was not paying attention to the only vehicle in the
vicinity.
Another identical case is that of Conkling vs. Walsh,
113 Utah 276, 193 P.2d 437 (Utah 1948). In this case
the Court directed a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff, Mr.
Conkling, finding that the drivers of both cars were negligent as a matter of law but that the negligence of the
Plaintiff's driver was not imputed to the Plaintiff. The
Plaintiff's driver stopped at the intersection for a stop
sign. She looked both ways, saw no traffic coming and
proceeded into the intersection without ever looking to
her right or left again until the collision occurred. The
Defendant testified as he approached the intersection he
saw the Plaintiff's vehicle approaching the stop sign. The
Defendant at that time was a quarter of a block west of
the intersection. He looked to his right and did not look
back to the north to observe the position of the Plaintiff's
driver until he was in the middle of the intersection and
the Plaintiff's driver was almost in front of him. The
Defendant argued that he could reasonably rely that the
Plaintiff's vehicle would stop and remain stopped at the
stop sign. The Court, however, pointed out that the Defendant knew there was a car approaching but never
looked again in that direction until it was too late to
avoid a collision, and that even though he had the technical right of way, he had a duty to remain reasonably
alert to the possibility of a disfavored driver starting
The Court held that the driver of
across the
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the Plaintiff's vehicle and the Defendant's vehicle were
negligent as a matter of law.
And likewise in the case of Richards vs. Anderson, 9
Utah 2d 17, 337 P .2d 59 ( 1959) , the Trial Court granted a Summary Judgment against the Plaintiff finding
him negligent as a matter of law. There the Defendant
had stopped for a stop sign, waited for several cars and
then entered into the intersection at five to ten miles per
hour. The Plaintiff was approaching the intersection at
fifteen to twenty miles per hour. The Plaintiff stated that
he failed to see the Defendant until just before the collision and too late to avoid it. He attempted to excuse that
neglect on the grounds that he had the right of way. The
Court found that from the physical facts the Plaintiff
had an adequate opportunity to observe the Defendant
but failed to do so. The Court found him negligent as a
matter of law, and in doing so held on page 61:
"While it was necessary for Plaintiff to be watching his own lane ahead, his vision was not like
looking through a pipe or a tunnel. His angle of
vision would take in the moving objects in the
adjacent lane, particularly a moving object such
as Defendant's car, had he been looking.
"It is a well settled rule that one may not be heard
to say that he did not see what was plain to be
seen. He either failed to look or saw and failed to
heed, either of which makes him negligent. . . .
The Plaintiff seems to have been guilty of the all
too common fault of modern driving of assuming
that because they are on a through highway they
have the absolute right of way and than one desiring to enter or cross it must do so at his peril.
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The evidence amply justified the Trial Court in
determining that he was precluded from recovery
because of his own negligence."
In the present case it is not even established that
Phyllis Perkins had the right of way nor that she was on
a through highway but even assuming she had the right
of way, under the facts and the law cited she is negligent
and her negligence proximately contributed to the collision.
The cases cited by the Appellants in their Brief under Points II and III are cited out of context and are
not in point inasmuch as they do not concern fact situations where one or both drivers knew of another vehicle's
proximity to the intersection and failed to keep a lookout
in regard to the same after having ample opportunity to
make such an observation considering the speed, distance
and traffic conditions. Appellants' assertion that Phyllis
should not have reasonably seen the truck prior to impact is untenable under the present facts. She had ample
opportunity to avoid the collision had she made any
effort to observe what there was to be seen.
Equally untenable is the assertion by Appellants
that Respondent's driver had waived his right of way and
that somehow this gave Phyllis the right to go headlong
into the intersection without exercising due care. The
law cited in the above cases makes it clear that Phyllis
Perkins could not assume a right of way, whether by
waiver or otherwise, and proceed without keeping a reasonable lookout. It should be noted that Appellants in
their Brief argue that Phyllis was only one hundred fifty
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-feet away from the intersection when she first saw the
truck, this being based upon the fact that she stated that
there were only four houses on the block and that she
saw the truck between the second and third house. Appellants' Counsel then makes the unwarranted assumption that there were only four building lots on the block
and that somehow means Phyllis was one hundred fifty
feet from the intersection. There was no evidence to support this assumption. The only evidence presented by the
Appellants was "half a block," and "two hundred to two
hundred fifty feet." They are now bound by that evidence.
Respondent respectfully submits, therefore, that the
evidence established as a matter of law negligence on the
part of Phyllis Utahna Perkins which negligence proximately contributed to the collision.
POINT II.
THE NEGLIGENCE OF PHYLLIS UTAHNA
PERKINS IS IMPUTED TO BOTH APPELLANTS.
Respondent answers herein in its Point II Appellants' Points IV and V.
The case law presented in Point IV of Appellants'
Brief is immaterial. Respondent agrees that a non-driving owner may generally recover from either joint tort
f easors; however, that is not the issue in the present case.
Here the Appellants are joint owners of the subject
automobile and the driver is a minor under the age of
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eighteen ( 18) year_s, whose negligence, if any, is imputed to the owners by law. Thus the citation by Appel113 Utah 276,
lants on page 23 of Conkling vs. W
193 P .2d 437 ( 1948) which concerned a non-driving sole
owner is not in point for that aspect. Likewise the citation
of Lavendar vs. Fox, and other cases on page 24 are not
in point since the agency sought to be created in Lavender is established by statute in the present case, to-wit:
U.C.A. 41-2-10 and 41-2-22. In regard to those statutes
the Appellants attempt to set up a straw man by ref erring
only to Section 41-2-10 which creates liability for the
signor of an application for a drivers license of a minor,
under the age of eighteen ( 18), arguing that such imputation does not go to the Appellant, Luke Phillips.
The Trial Court, however, bas.ed its decision herein primarily on Section 41-2-22 which states as follows:
"41-2-22. Owner liable for negligence of minor.Every owner of a motor vehicle causing or knowingly permitting a minor under the age of
eighteen years to drive such vehicle upon a highway, and any person who gives or furnishes a
motor vehicle to such minor, shall be jointly and
severally liable with such minor for any damages
caused by the negligence of such minor in driving
such vehicle."
Appellants direct no argument or comment at all to
this statute and its effect. The obvious effect of the statute is to create as a matter of law civil responsibility upon
the owner of a vehicle allowing a minor's use thereof.
Where such facts exist, it is not necessary to determine
an agency since such is created by law on the owners.
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The facts before the Trial Court were undisputed as
to joint ownership. The car was registered in the names
of both Appellants, it was being purchased from earnings from the "Club 13" a family business and enterprise
being run jointly by the Appellants with said vehicle being used by both Appellants for the general benefit of
their household. There was no contrary evidence as to
the joint ownership of said vehicle. The facts were also
undisputed that Ruby Phillips, acting as a joint owner
and for purposes within the scope of said joint ownership,
to-wit: use of a vehicle for the benefit of the residents of
the Appellants' household, permitted Phyllis Utahna
Perkins to drive said vehicle at the time and place at
issue and, therefore, Appellants come within the imputation of responsibility of Section 41-2-22.
Appellants assert in their Point IV that Section
41-2-10 does not impute contributory negligence but is
limited to the imputation of liability. The two cases cited
by Appellants in support thereof are a minority position
and do not present a logical and reasonable path for this
Court to follow. It has generally been held that such imputation statutes impute contributory negligence as well
as liability. This has been the rule in California stated in
Solloway vs. Watts, 137 P.2d 477 (Calif. 1943) and
Birnbaum vs. Blunt, 313 P .2d 87 (Calif. 1957). In the
Solloway case, the Court held as follows on page 478:
"The imputation of negligence to a parent is not
limited to actions of third persons against the
parent but it extends to actions in which the parent seeks redress and damages. The imputation
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extends to all cases where the rights and obligations of parents are invoked in civil actions for
damages .... "
A similar result was reached in the following cases:
Secured Finance Company vs. Chicago, Rock Island,
and Pacific Railway Co., 224 NW 88 (Iowa 1929); National Trucking and Storage Company vs. Driscoll, 64
A.2d 304, (D.C. 1949); Baber vs. Akers Motor Lines,
215 F.2d 843, (App. D.C.); DiLeo vs. DuMontier, 195
So. 74, (La. App. 1904); Fontenot vs. Pan American
Fire and Casualty Co., 209 So.2d 105, (La.); and
Schiebe vs. Lincoln, 471 NW 74 (Wis. 1937).
It would be a non-sequitur in the law for a person to
be given a statutory responsibility for the negligence of
a minor but on the other hand allowed to benefit against
third parties notwithstanding the negligence of said
minor for whom the owner is responsible. Such a result
would be contrary to the obvious purpose and intent of
the statute and the Legislature that formulated the same.

The Appellants likewise seek a strained reading of
the imputation statute by suggesting that the word
"minor" does not apply to Phyllis Utahna Perkins because she was married at the time of the accident. The
Supreme Court of Utah, however, in Rogers vs. Wagstaff, 120 Utah 136, 232 P.2d 766, ( 1951) held that
under U.C.A. 41-2-10 the words "minor under the age
of eighteen" meant exactly that, a person who was under
the age of eighteen years and marriage as far as the imputation statute was concerned had no effect on such a
person's minority status.
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Respondent submits that U.C.A. 41-2-22 applies in
the present case to impute the negligence of Phyllis
Utahna Perkins to the Appellants.

CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully submits that the Trial
Court properly found as a matter of law negligence on
the part of Phyllis Utahna Perkins and that under the
laws of the State of Utah such negligence is imputed to
the Appellants and bars their recovery for damages to
their vehicle driven by said minor.
Respectfully submitted,
MOYLE & DRAPER
W. Brent Wilcox
800 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Respondent
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